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NICARAGUA

The L-39's which Libya plans to deliver to Nicaragua via Bulgaria are still awaiting delivery, possibly at a politically opportune moment for Managua.

- The Sandinistas may want to wait until after the EC meeting with Central American countries in Costa Rica on 28-29 September is concluded.
- The Salvadoran insurgent offensive also may be underway by that time, which Managua may hope will distract US attention.

Meanwhile, Sandinista Interior Minister Borge has been visiting both Libya and Eastern Europe, possibly to discuss new aid agreements and coordinate the timing of the L-39 delivery.

- He was last reported in Poland on 16 September after first visiting Libya and Bulgaria early in the month.

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- Once the L-39's leave Bulgaria, it would take them about 18 days to transit by ship to Nicaragua.

Several Sandinista officials have stated openly that Punta Huete airfield will be a base for the L-39's when they arrive.

- The Sandinista Minister of Construction indicated [REDACTED] that construction was winding down, but that large underground fuel tanks had not yet been installed there.

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- [REDACTED] the main runway is under construction and could be completed by early October, but support facilities are still lacking.

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Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega, meanwhile has reiterated that Nicaragua still plans to obtain MIG-21's, implying that the L-39's are only an interim step.

- He recently told a French correspondent, in response to a question about whether MIG's would arrive in Nicaragua just before the US election, that pilots are training on MIG's, and the aircraft will arrive when the pilots are fully trained.

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19 September 1984

Chad

Chadian President Habre will look to the US for increased support out of fear that Libyan-backed dissidents will over time weaken his regime's position in the north and south and that Paris will stand aside as long as there is no direct Libyan intervention.

- Habre has agreed to accept troops from Senegal and Morocco but not Benin to observe the French-Libyan withdrawal.
- Habre has a 10-12,000 basically light infantry force composed of loyal northerners and rallied southerners, with some armored cars and artillery.
- Habre is preparing to reoccupy northern outposts to be abandoned by the Libyans, expects many of the 4,000 Chadian dissidents in the north to rally to his regime, and believes that the remainder can be defeated.
- Habre views his situation in the south as critical where several thousand well armed Libyan-backed dissidents have escalated fighting in recent weeks, requiring additional deployment to the region of elements of the elite presidential guard and 300 Zairian-trained commandos.

Libyan leader Qadhafi probably will abide by the withdrawal agreement for at least six months in the belief that a moderate image will avoid any pretext for French intervention and block US efforts to isolate Libya.

- Qadhafi will use the withdrawal to revitalize Libyan-controlled Chadian dissidents in the north, abandoning Goukouni if necessary, and will continue to provide arms and money to dissident groups in southern Chad.
- Tripoli has left the door open for renewed Libyan military intervention by refusing to withdraw from the Aozou Strip.

France likely will demand rigid observance of the withdrawal agreement, continue material support for Habre, and respond to increased Libyan aid to Chadian dissidents with stepped-up aid to Habre.

- Jaguar aircraft and 2,000 French troops will be withdrawn to Central Africa Republic.
- As leverage to insure Qadhafi's future good behavior, France may have held out the prospect of renewed arms sales to Libya and even a Qadhafi visit to Paris.

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Acting NIO/AF

17 September 1984

Talking Points for the DCI - Sudan

- I. Southern Sudanese insurgents may now be ready to launch the offensive that we have been expecting for some weeks. New small-scale attacks have occurred and the insurgents recently received an important psychological and propaganda boost when they occupied a key town near the site where important oil exploration activities are under way.
 - A. The insurgents appear better armed than they were last year.
 1. Libyan arms continue to reach the anti-Nimeiri Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA).
 2. We think heavy weapons such as mortars and machineguns have reached the rebels in their camps in Ethiopia.
- II. Insurgent strategy is to inflict tactical defeats on government forces in the south. This is intended to:
 - Raise to unacceptable levels the cost to Nimeiri of maintaining troops in the south.
 - Keep the military pressure on while simultaneously focusing international attention on southern grievances against Nimeiri that resulted from Nimeiri's inept handling of the southern

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problem. The recent capture of several hostages by the insurgents is intended to impact on outside powers who have influence with Nimeiri and to obtain ransom.

III. Government military capabilities to respond to the insurgents, if the latter succeed in stepping up the pace of the insurgency, remain weak.

- A. Transportation difficulties have forced the government to rely on the air force to resupply and reinforce garrisons in the south.
- B. There are few flyable aircraft for this task.
- C. Morale is low among southern units.

IV. Nimeiri has reportedly tried several times to make contact with rebels without success. We are not clear how hard he has tried or whether the lack of success is due largely to rebel intransigence.

V. US efforts to talk with the rebels as an unofficial mediator have likewise been unsuccessful.

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Attachment: Map of Sudan (Secret)

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #05395-84
19 September 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: [REDACTED]
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Libya and Sudan

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1. With reference to the talking points on Sudan that I gave to [REDACTED] for your use this week, I wonder if there is another aspect to the Sudan situation that we ought to be alert to. Considering Qadhafi's new "moderate" stance, how does Qadhafi now view Sudan? More importantly, how does Nimeiri view Qadhafi?

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2. Nimeiri has seen King Hassan reach an unprecedented accord with Qadhafi. He has also seen the French strike an agreement with the Libyan leader that, once the French troops are gone, could again plunge Chad into internal conflict that Habre might not be able to control. Instability could once more engulf the Sudan-Chad border area, raising the possibility of Libyan exploitation at some future time.

3. Nimeiri no doubt has concluded that the US was caught by surprise by both developments, and that US interests in both Morocco and Chad have suffered. He may also calculate that the US will again seek his help in supporting Habre if the Chadian leader's position is threatened, and that we have only limited military assistance to provide him in compensation for his help to the US.

4. Considering Nimeiri's considerable internal problems, particularly the threat posed by Libyan-backed rebels in southern Sudan, might not Nimeiri seek an accommodation with Qadhafi in the hope that Qadhafi would withdraw support to the rebels? While there is no intelligence that Nimeiri is contemplating such an action, the US had

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
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virtually no warning concerning the French-Libyan agreement. I am not suggesting Nimeiri will attempt to mend fences with the unpredictable Qadhafi, but we ought to consider such a possibility and be alert for indications that he might do so.

5. It may be worth raising this point with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger.



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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC 05374-84
19 September 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Qadhafi's Recent Political Moves: Is He Weaker Than
We Had Believed?

1. The recent French-Libyan agreement for mutual withdrawal of both parties from the Chad conflict comes as something of a surprise. A superficial examination of the agreement indicates it would deprive Qadhafi of the half of Chad over which he had established control. It represents an overall weakening of his position there.

-- Qadhafi can of course renege on the agreement--this is the second time he has withdrawn from Chad. In theory he could now step up subversion in southern Chad but he would be going for dubious long term gains as opposed to the concrete ones he already had.

2. It would seem questionable to attribute this withdrawal in Chad to the recent Libyan-Moroccan union, yet King Hassan has said that he would be able to "moderate" Libyan policy. Senior Algerian officials complained two weeks ago that France supported the Libyan-Moroccan union because the French believed it would lead to Qadhafi's withdrawal from Chad--and even the Algerians did not believe Qadhafi would pull out. But he did.

-- Interestingly, Syrian and Iranian dismay at the Libyan-Moroccan union would also suggest that it was hardly viewed as a breakthrough by radical forces in the Middle East.

3. The only reasonable explanation for this puzzling step by Qadhafi consistent with some of his other actions is that he is much more shaken by the May uprising in Tripoli than we had believed.

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
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suggests that he has grown more reclusive, ever more suspicious, is planning a major purge of 70 top military officers and trusts no one. President Assad, while recently visiting in Tripoli, was struck by Qadhafi's incredible fixation with security.

-- In short, Qadhafi may be increasingly fearful of his own position internally--probably suggesting difficulties of which we are not fully aware. As we pointed out in our recent vulnerability estimate, Libyan military discontent with Chad represented a major weakness of the regime. I can only conclude that Qadhafi is cutting his losses--and gains--in Chad to relieve any pressure on him from this quarter. He may see the Moroccan union as a way to diminish potential enemies and cope with his fears of weakness.

4. We have seen wildly erratic pendulum swings in Qadhafi's behavior before and there is no reason to believe he has really changed this time. Nonetheless, the Chad withdrawal is very significant and suggests that more is going on with Libya than meets the eye.

-- Although the USG may be irked at the failure of the French, Moroccans and the Chadians to give us advance notice of this withdrawal agreement, it has to be in the US interest and represents a net setback to Qadhafi's ambitions. In short, Qadhafi may view himself as in a more precarious situation than we have believed. We need to watch the Libyan internal scene far more closely.



Graham E. Fuller

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